Emory Undergraduate Journal of Law & Society

Introduction

The sentencing of juvenile offenders has stirred a contentious legal issue, igniting scholarly debates about whether imposing mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment. Before 2005, adolescents convicted of homicide could be subjected to the death penalty, and as of 2012, around 2,500 individuals were serving life sentences for offenses they committed in their teenage years [1]. Over time, landmark cases such as Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi have endeavored to address this intricate matter, supported by behavioral
science and neuroscience [2]. Despite numerous cases surrounding juvenile sentencing and the established legal precedents, there still remains a muddled understanding concerning how to interpret and convict the offender. Anchored in data and logical reasoning, many concur that
children are different from adults in terms of brain development—encompassing an undeveloped sense of responsibility, susceptibility to external influences, and maturity—thereby warranting mitigation of their culpability and sentences [3]. Nonetheless, dissenting voices, such as Chief Justice John Roberts in Miller v. Alabama, assert that the law’s primary concern is how people behave and not how the brain functions [4]. In the face of these opposing ideologies, each laden with their own set of complexities, one question arises: “Can these contrasting viewpoints be united to cultivate a more holistic sentencing process, or is the Court grappling with an unanswerable question?

Miller v. Alabama: A Shift in Sentencing

In 2003, Evan Miller received a mandatory life sentence without parole at the age of fourteen for the murder of Cole Cannon [5]. Miller argued that his sentence was excessively harsh for a fourteen-year-old and constituted cruel and unusual punishment [6]. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-4 majority decision favored Miller, declaring that his sentence, as well as the death penalty, violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court established that only “rare juvenile offenders whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” should face such extreme punishment [7]. The Court mandated “only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.

The Court, grounded by developmental science and aided by common sense, recognized that minors are constitutionally different from adults, and subjecting both demographics to the same punishment would be disproportionate [8]. In a study done by Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System, sensation seeking— defined as “the tendency to pursue new and different sensations and take risks to pursue those experiences”—increases substantially in the early teenage years and remains high into the early twenties [9]. The prefrontal cortex, responsible for decision-making, impulse control, and understanding long-term consequences, doesn’t fully develop until the mid-to-late-twenties. Similarly, impulse control is low during childhood and grows gradually throughout young adulthood [10]. Consequently, it’s unsurprising that the “age-crime curve” reflects the data on risky behavior in adolescents, showing peak arrests in early adulthood for crimes like robbery, burglary, and forcible rape [11].

The progress and expansion made in neuroscience became a double-edged sword for the Court. On one hand, it solidified the logical reasoning that children are distinct from adults, necessitating a discourse on the criminal blameworthiness of an offender. On the other hand, the Court then had the responsibility to decide how and to what extent it would allow the integration of data into the sentencing procedure. Overall, Miller is considered a step in the right direction in the criminal culpability of juveniles by acknowledging the disparity in brain development. Referred to as the “Miller factors,” the sentencer is obligated to consider the offender’s youth, home environment, circumstances of their offense, challenges in the justice system, and the chance of rehabilitation [12]. Yet, despite the promise that Miller upheld for reshaping the treatment of juvenile offenders, its application was not without its own set of complexities. As is often the case with legal precedents, the practical implications of such rulings can be far-reaching and entail intricate legal debates. What initially appeared as a clear-cut ruling actually unleashed a newfound predicament due to the Court’s specific use of the term “irreparable corruption.” This insinuated that courts now faced the impossible task of prognosticating the future by determining a child’s incorrigibility after a prison sentence, along with identifying any evidence that could substantiate it.

Jones v. Mississippi (2021)

Jones v. Mississippi possesses its own distinct elements, not merely for its immediate ramifications but for the questions it raises about the exercise of Miller’s principles. In 2005, Brett Jones was convicted for the murder of his grandfather at the age of fifteen and was imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law rendered him ineligible for parole. Later, The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Mr. Jones a post-conviction relief proceeding in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana. The Montgomery ruling of 2016 was crucial to Jones due to its explicit procedural language, wherein they prohibited life without parole “for all but the rarest juvenile offenders, whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility” [13]. Despite the rulings in Miller and Montgomery, the trial judge still determined that Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility, albeit lacking the verbiage to support the finding of Mr. Jones’s incorrigibility [14]. Mr. Jones then contended that, based on the precedents set by Miller and Montgomery, he possessed the right to require a sentencing authority to find that he was permanently incorrigible before being sentenced.

In contrast to Miller, where the decision clarified the need to consider an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before imposing a life sentence, Jones v. Mississippi initiated a discordant perspective. The Court did not entirely negate the implications of Miller but instead appeared to emphasize the discretionary power of judges. The 6-3 decision held that a judge does not need to make a specific finding of “permanent incorrigibility” in order to impose a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender [15]. It was understood that Miller primarily created a more structured procedure for judges to follow in terms of sentencing considerations—and that was its extent. In the end, Mr. Jones’s claim that his sentence was in violation of the Eighth Amendment (supported by Miller), was refuted.

Instead of further explicating the definition or the criteria for establishing “irreparable corruption,” the Court chose to discard the concept entirely [16]. As a result, Jones v. Mississippi created a nuanced narrative, with some arguing that it introduced a level of subjectivity that could potentially undermine the intent of Miller [17].

The core issue presented by Jones v. Mississippi is the very same problem of prediction that has threaded through discussions concerning the treatment of juvenile offenders. The Court’s determination that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility is not required” indicates the inherent challenge of forecasting an individual’s potential for rehabilitation [18]. This ruling arguably reintroduces the element of uncertainty that Miller sought to mitigate. Both cases solidified that if a court concludes that a juvenile is unlikely to change, then imposing a life without parole sentence is deemed appropriate. This assessment entails an examination of the individual’s past behavior but fundamentally involves predicting whether they will transform after an extended period of imprisonment—a prediction that surpasses modern science’s capabilities.

The Unanswerable Question: The Problematic Game of Prediction

How can one prove that a juvenile is irreparably corrupt and will pose a danger for decades to come? The answer? It’s impossible. Even with newly developed research and data in neuroscience and behavioral development, the Court is left to rely solely on its judgment for such matters. The task of predicting an individual’s behavior was coined as “future dangerousness” determinations, first accredited in Jurek v. Texas (1976). In a study conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union, a report by the Texas Defender’s Service found that in “95% of the cases where experts testified that a defendant was likely to be dangerous in the future, they were wrong” (2004). This demonstrates that “future dangerousness” predictions are more akin to random guesses than originally presumed. Despite having more than 200 structured tools available within forensic psychiatry and criminal justice to assess the risk of violence, accurate and unbiased data regarding their predictive accuracy is scarce [19]. Cases like Miller and Jones exemplify what is known as the false positive problem—incorrect predictions that offenders will commit new crimes—stemming from the overestimation of future criminality. In essence, asserting that the courts have the capability to ascertain whether a juvenile is “irreparably corrupt” extends beyond the scope of scientific understanding or human reasoning.

Conclusion

The evolving landscape of juvenile sentencing has witnessed pivotal legal battles, exemplified by cases like Miller v. Alabama and Jones v. Mississippi, each leaving its imprint on the intricate fabric of justice. While Miller marked a significant step forward by recognizing the developmental disparities between juveniles and adults, its legacy was paradoxically trapped in the conundrum of predicting an adolescent’s potential for permanent change. As seen by the Jones ruling, efforts to bridge the gap between youthful impulsivity and legal culpability have introduced an undercurrent of subjectivity, potentially undermining the intent of Miller. The heart of the matter, as illuminated by these cases, is the elusiveness of certainty when it comes to gauging the future trajectory of a juvenile offender. The Court’s quest to determine “irreparable corruption” involves venturing into the realm of prediction, a domain where even the most advanced neuroscience and behavioral science offer scant insight. The track record of “future dangerousness” determinations underscores the fallibility of such forecasts [20]. In the end, the notion of ascertaining a juvenile’s incorrigibility and forecasting their behavior remains a daunting, unanswerable question, transcending the boundaries of both scientific knowledge and human rationale. The legal system’s pursuit of justice for juvenile offenders will undoubtedly continue to grapple with this formidable challenge as society seeks a harmonious balance between accountability, rehabilitation, and the imperfections of foreseeing the unknown. But it is clear that an unsound game of prediction is at play within the courtroom.

Endnotes

[1] Rovner, Joshua. “Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview.” The Sentencing Project, Apr. 2023,
https://www.sentencingproject.org/policy-brief/juvenile-life-without-parole-an-overview/

[2] Steinberg, Laurence. “The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions about Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, vol. 14, no. 7, 12 June 2013, pp. 513–518, http://www.nature.com/articles/nrn3509, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3509

[3] Ibid.

[4] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, p.493

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Steinberg, Laurence. “The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions about
Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, vol. 14, no. 7, 12 June 2013, pp. 513–518, http://www.nature.com/articles/nrn3509, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3509

[9] “Sensation Seeking.” Psychology Today,
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/sensation-seeking

[10] Romer, Daniel. “Adolescent risk taking, impulsivity, and brain development: implications for prevention.” Developmental psychobiology vol. 52,3 (2010): 263-76. doi:10.1002/dev.20442

[11] Steinberg, Laurence. “The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions about
Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, vol. 14, no. 7, 12 June 2013, pp. 513–518, http://www.nature.com/articles/nrn3509, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3509

[12] Marshall, Mary. “Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction.” Columbia Law Review, vol. 119, no. 6, October 2019, pp. 1633-1670. Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., https://www.jstor.org/stable/26794352.

[13] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

[14] Harvard Law Review. “Jones v. Mississippi.” Harvard Law Review, https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-135/jones-v-mississippi/

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Douglas, T et al. “Risk assessment tools in criminal justice and forensic psychiatry: The need for better data.” European psychiatry : the journal of the Association of European Psychiatrists vol. 42 (2017): 134-137. doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.12.009

[20] Jurek v. Texas. 428 U.S. 262 (1976)